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way.  The model simulations show that the WTO imposed tariff reforms will reduce the 
overall welfare level of the Vietnamese households. Moreover, the biggest loss of income will 
take place among the poor rural households in Vietnam. We propose other tariff reforms that 
both raise overall welfare and reduce income inequality. 
JEL-Code: F140, F170, C680. 





Henrik Barslund Fosse 
Department of Economics 
Copenhagen Business School 
Porcelaenshaven 16A 




Department of Economics 
Copenhagen Business School 
Porcelaenshaven 16A 




   
   
 
 
October 24, 2011 
We wish to thank participants at the CESifo 2009 Global Economy conference and at the 
ETSG 2009 meeting for valuable comments and suggestions.  Financial  support from the 
Danish Social Science Research Council is gratefully acknowledged. 3
1. Introduction
On January 11, 2007, and after 12 years of accession process, Vietnam became the 150th member
of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Becoming a member of the WTO ultimately implies
a binding tariﬀ schedule. The Vietnamese accession process will be formally completed when a
gradual reduction of the existing tariﬀ rates reach the pre-determined ﬁnal rates. This will be
the case in 2014.
The present paper evaluates this accession-led trade liberalization using a computable general
equilibrium (CGE) model calibrated to the Vietnamese economy. In doing that, special attention
is paid to the existence of state-owned enterprises and how they aﬀect the economy by large.
Moreover, we pay attention to income distribution issues among heterogeneous households and
we investigate how diﬀerent trade liberalization schemes aﬀect this distribution. While linking
trade liberalization to income distribution is not by itself novel, doing that in the presence of
state-owned enterprises and for a calibrated model of the Vietnamese WTO accession is, to the
best of our knowledge, novel to the literature.1
In modelling state-owned enterprises we follow the approach adopted in several writings
about state-owned enterprises in general, viz. that they do not maximize proﬁts (see Schmitz.,
J., 1996; and World Bank, 2005). More in particular, we follow Whalley and Zhang (2006) who
assume that state-owned enterprises maximize revenues. With prices being ﬁxed by the world
market (Vietnam being a small open economy), this maximizing revenue assumption implies
that state-owned enterprises in reality maximize output and thus employment. As we will show,
introducing such a state-owned enterprise behavior in an otherwise standard trade model of a
small open economy alters considerably the welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent tariﬀ reforms.
We will show that if the state-owned enterprises behaved as proﬁt maximizers, the WTO
accession tariﬀ reforms would both increase aggregate real income and reduce income inequality
– clearly, a win-win situation. However, with state-owned enterprises maximizing revenues,
the WTO accession tariﬀ reforms will end up doing exactly the opposite, viz. reduce aggregate
income and increase income inequality. The samew i l lb et r u ef o ro t h e rw e l l - k n o w nr e f o r mr u l e s
– the concertina rule (where the highest tariﬀ is reduced to the second highest level) and the
1See Abbott et al. (2009) for a survey of this literature using Vietnam as the case of study. Similar to
our paper, Ghosh and Whalley (2008) focus on Vietnam and trade liberalization under state-owned enterprices.
However, both the model and the experiments they consider are quite diﬀerent from ours (they apply a shirking
model of state-owned enterprises that they use to analyze the case of zero tariﬀs, and thus not a move from one
tariﬀ-ridden equilibrium to another).4
proportional rule (where all tariﬀ rates are reduced by the same proportion). In other words,
all the well-known tariﬀ reduction rules bound to fail when state-owned enterprises distort the
market economy.
Given this distorting behavior of state-owned enterprises, one may want to know what kind of
tariﬀ reform would achieve the goals of higher real income and lower income inequality. We show
that the main characteristic of this reform has to be a large and disproportionate reduction of
the protection of the state-owned sector – in fact, we will show that if the imports of the goods
produced by the state-owned enterprises are subsidized, both welfare and income distribution
will improve. We will provide intuition for this and all other results after we explain what state-
owned enterprises imply to the market equilibrium. Firstly, however, and in order to set the
background for our model choices, we provide a brief description of the Vietnamese economy
and the signiﬁcance of the state-owned enterprises in that economy.
1.1. Vietnam. Vietnam is a country in change. It is turning global in many aspects —
culturally, socially, and economically. Table 1 shows the change of the overall structure of the
Vietnamese economy in the period 1990-2006, with manufacturing clearly increasing its GDP
value added at the cost of the primary sector.
Year Agriculture, forestry Industry and Service
and ﬁshing construction
1990 39 23 39
2006 20 42 38
Source: General Statistics Oﬃce of Vietnam
Table 1: Decomposition of GDP in Vietnam (pct.)
However, while industrialization has made manufacturing and services the predominant
providers of value added, the income source of the majority of the Vietnamese population is
still the primary sector. As of 2006, more than 58 % of the population were employed within
these industries (see table 2).
Since the majority of the population, and especially of the lower-income households, is em-
ployed in the labour-intensive primary sector, this sector is of special consideration. That the
poor people work in the rural areas is supported by looking at the urban-rural 0.37 Gini coef-
ﬁcient, implying that wealth distribution is skewed moderately towards urban Vietnam. Com-
bined with a 0.28 Gini coeﬃcient of rural Vietnam, this points towards a generally low, but
even, rural per capita income level. Clearly, and as one would expect from a socialist country,5
Employment by kind of economic activity, pct. (2006)






Transport, storage and communications 2.9
Culture, health and education 4.0
Other services 3.7
UNDP Poverty Line (2002), pct. 29.0
UNDP Food Poverty Line (2002), pct. 10.9
UNDP Urban/Rural Gini coeﬃcient 0.37
Urban 0.35
Rural 0.28
Source: General Statistics Oﬃce of Vietnam
Table 2: Employment, Poverty and Income Distribution
the overall income inequality in Vietnam is relatively low – a 0.3 value places Vietnam between
the Scandinavian countries (0.26) and the USA (0.408), and close to countries such as France,
Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom. But Vietnam is a low income developing country.
A growth in income inequality may be devastating for many Vietnamese families if the source
of this growth is lower income at the bottom end of the income scale. According to the United
Nations Development Programme in Vietnam, even though absolute poverty has been reduced
considerably throughout the 90’s, 29% of the population were still living below the poverty line
in 2002 (UNDP VN, 2002). In rough numbers that is more than 23 million people in a country
with more than 80 million inhabitants.
Focusing on the importance of state-owned enterprises it should be mentioned that from
1995 to 2006, state ownership of production facilities has decreased from 50% to 38%, house-
hold ownership of production facilities has decreased from 36% to 30%, while foreign investment
ownership of production has increased from 6% to 17%. Moreover, this state production is very
much focused in the industrial sector; in 2006, 75% of the state output was industrial output.
Such predominance of state-owned ﬁrms can be explained by what the literature calls a Guanxi
approach (Ashwill and Diep, 2005) – typically assumed for Chinese state-owned ﬁrms. Viet-
namese culture exhibits – along with pervasive corruption – a system of relationship building
similar to the Guanxi system in China. In such a system, a politically appointed management
may build up prestige by securing many jobs for the locals in the local community. More im-6
portantly to the management, by managing a large enterprise it may increase its proceeds from
networking with other managers (under the assumption that the larger the ﬁrm you manage,
the more important people you will network with). The management may also experience pro-
ceeds from networking with inﬂuential party members who politically motivated – directly or
indirectly – facilitate a subsidy to the ﬁrm. Hence, by maximizing employment and size of the
ﬁrm, the manager is assumed to maximize personal utility.
One of the focal points of the state-owned enterprise reform in Vietnam has been to reduce
the number of typically small local government controlled ﬁrms (UNDP VN, 2006; Sjöholm,
2006). The local governed state-owned ﬁrms have been singled out as a way of channeling state
resources to other purposes than intended. Equitization is conceived as the way of restructuring
state-owned ﬁrms. By creating publicly listed ﬁrms, where the government may own only
some shares, the government wants to make the state-owned enterprises partly dependent on
competitive capital funding. In general, however, the high national dependency on state output
seems to slow down the privatization process. Large SOEs seem so far to have been exempted
from equitization. Moreover, the evidence of major sourcing of equities to non-governmental
stakeholders has yet to be seen. The General Statistics Oﬃce of Vietnam (GSO) provides data
f o rh o wm a n yp e o p l ea r ee m p l o y e di ns t a t e - o w n e dp roduction facilities, how many state-owned
ﬁrms exist, but not how much they produce, what proﬁts are, and e.g. which state ﬁrms are
equitized and what governs the principle of foreign investments in these ﬁrms.2
On the basis of the above facts, we build a model where state-owned enterprises are explicitly
taken into account within an otherwise traditional general equilibrium model of the Vietnamese
economy. We also pay careful attention to heterogenous households and their source of income.
In what follows, we describe in detail the model chosen.
2. The Model
2.1. Production. We model a speciﬁc-factor small open economy. There are four represen-
tative producers of four ﬁnal goods in the economy: A competitive primary producer, ,a
competitive (private) light manufacturer, ,am a n u f a c t u r i n gstate-owned enterprise, ,a n d
a rest-of-economy sector, .
2Moreover, even if one observes private share owners, these may in turn owned by a public agent. This is an
often cited problem in the literature on assessments of Chinese state-ownership of publicly as well as (seemingly)
privately held (oﬀ-listed) companies. As pointed out by Whalley and Zhang (2006) one example is Lenovo. The
company is formally owned by Legend Holdings. However, Legend Holding is controlled by the Chinese Academy
of Natural Sciences.7







  =  (1)
where  is the speciﬁc factor of the respective sectors, and thus  = 
1−
 is just a scalar.
Three of the sectors have identical structures but diﬀerent inputs to production. In the
primary sector, , the single immobile factor is land, while in the two other competitive sectors
the immobile factor is sector-speciﬁc capital. Proﬁt maximization under perfect competition
yields the traditional result that labour is paid its marginal product value. Moreover, zero
proﬁts are achieved. The immobile factor is paid a residual rent. That is,











=  ( − )  0    0=  (2)
The fourth sector, the state-owned enterprises, behaves diﬀerently. By assuming that the
management of the state-owned ﬁrms seeks to maximize the size of the enterprise and not its
proﬁts, it hires as many workers as possible. Hence, state capital is considered allocated free of
cost from the perspective of the state-owned ﬁrm. The problem of the ﬁrm simply is to maximize
revenues subject to the wage bill, which implies hiring labour at a nominal wage rate equal to
t h ev a l u ea v e r a g ep r o d u c to fl a b o u r , = · , instead of the value marginal product of
labour,  · , as is the case in the rest of the economy. Since   0,   
for any 0 As is the case in the competitive part of the economy, the residual rents of the
SOE go to the immobile factor: state allocated capital. However, since capital is allocated free
of cost, the rents accrued by the government are eﬀectively zero.3
2.2. Households. The model considers three households. Two lower-income households in
rural and urban areas, 1and 2 respectively, and a higher-income household, 3, found both in
the rural and urban areas. Household preferences for the goods consumed are represented by
3It is this zero capital rent property of SOEs that motivates our choice of a speciﬁc-factor model. If we
considered a Hecksher-Ohlin model with intersectoral mobility of all factors, then the zero cost of capital would
extend to all sectors – clealry, an undesirable property within a general equilibrium model (it would be equivalent
to having only labour as factor of production). Ghosh and Whalley (2008) consider also a speciﬁc-factor model















 =1 23 =  (3)
where  is the elasticity of substitution,4 and  denotes the share parameter that determines
demand patterns of the households.










()+  =1 23   =  (4)




  =1 ), and  are the residual




6=  =1 ). Using  and , the modeler assigns prop-
erty rights of the total economy factor endowments to the households.  denotes total transfers
to/from the government. These are described in detail when introducing the government below.
 denotes household share of  where
P
  =1 .



















1− is the subjective CES price index.
2.3. Government. Given our small open economy assumption, world prices are kept ﬁxed.
By setting tariﬀs at an arbitrary level the government has full control over the domestic prices.
Assuming ad valorem tariﬀ rates, the domestic prices () are given by world prices () times
the mark-up (1+), where  is the percentage tax rate on imports, i.e.
 = 
 (1 + ) (6)
The government solely focuses on managing a balanced budget. Hence, it is simply repre-
4For our calculations we set this elasticity at 0.8. Other values (i.e. 0.6 and 0.9) have been used without any
change to our qualitative results.9
sented by a budget constraint




  +  (7)
where  is government expenditure,  is revenues from trade taxes and rents accrued from
state-owned enterprise capital (which, as discussed above, is zero if SOE maximize revenues),
and  being imports deﬁned as excess demand ( =
P
  − ). The actions available to
balance the budget are simple lump-sum taxes, i.e. either collecting a lump sum tax from the
households in case of a budget deﬁcit, or distributing a lump sum tax to the consumers in case
of a budget surplus.
Finally, full employment and balanced trade conditions are imposed to clear the labour and
goods markets, respectively.
Before moving to the calibration of the model using data from Vietnam, we should emphasize
the importance of having state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the model. We showed that under
the assumption that SOEs maximize revenues, a SOE will hire labour at a wage equal to the
value of the average product instead of the value of the marginal product of labour. The SOE
will thus demand more labour than is economically eﬃcient. This higher demand will drive up
the (nominal) wage and lower the potential output of the rest of the economy. In this situation,
at a r i ﬀ on SOE produced goods will aggravate the distortion SOEs create, as it will even further
move recourses towards the state-owned sector. Reducing tariﬀs is naturally a correct response
to this. However, as the theory of the second-best tells us, not any tariﬀ reduction will work.
That is exactly the purpose of building an applied general equilibrium and calibrating to the
Vietnamese data.
3. Case Study: The Vietnamese Accession to the WTO
Using Vietnam’s WTO accession as a case, we proceed by calibrating the model to the data.
To do that, we need to aggregate the existing data into 3 type of households and 4 type of
production sectors. Starting from production, functions are calibrated on the basis of the value
added shares of each of the four sectors in the model. Consumer demands are then preset
residually to match trade patterns of the Vietnamese economy. A top down split of GDP shares
i ss h o w ni nt a b l e3 .
The primary production sector, , includes the activities agriculture, forestry and ﬁshing10
Non- Private State
Total primary Primary Rest of manufac- manufac-
economy sectors sector economy turing turing
Year 2004 (p,l,roe,soe) (l,roe,soe) (p) (roe) (l) (soe)
Labour 703 6748 0 74 8 24 8 2 100
Capital 255 326 − 5185 2 8 −
Land 42 − 193 −−−
GDP shares 100 7822 1 83 8 01 1 32 8 9
Source: Nielsen (2002), General Statistics Oﬃce of Vietnam, IMF WEO,
Penn World Table, and own calculations
Table 3: Model benchmark: Sectoral GDP shares and factor allocation
which sum to 218% of GDP. The factor allocation in the primary sector implies a 80.7% labour
value added share and a 193% land value added share. Aggregate capital formation constitutes
255% of GDP. Capital is allocated in the manufacturing and service industries and comprise
326% of non-primary production value added. These are split on the two private sectors,  and
, since the assumption of un-priced capital in state-owned enterprises implies that labour
value added makes up a 100% of total factor value added going into SOE production, .
Recall that the value of  is a product of 1−
 and an unobservable sector speciﬁc tech-
nology scale parameter,  . Given the Ricardo-Viner structure of the model, calibration of the
parameters  and  suﬃc e s .T h ec a l i b r a t e dv a l u e sa r es h o w ni nt a b l e4 .
pr o els o e
 081 048 048 030
 168 824 441 883
Source: WTO, Comtrade and own calculations
Table 4: Supply side parameters in the Vietnam Model
Moving into the demand side of the economy, we need to match the Vietnamese reality
described in the introductory section and thus consider three heterogenous households: the
lower income rural population, 1, the lower income urban population, 2, and the higher
income population, 3, found in urban as well as rural Vietnam.
The key to distribute factor income among the three households stems from Nielsen’s (2002)
social accountancy matrix (SAM) found most suitable for the purpose of this analysis. From
this SAM, a small sub-matrix is extracted and simpliﬁed.
The point of departure for creating the postul a t e di n c o m ed i s t r i b u t i o ni sa na s s i g n m e n t
of rights of access to the factor endowments. As mentioned previously, income inequality in11
Vietnam is no higher than in a typical European economy. In general, inequality is low but there
is an above average inequality between rural and urban Vietnam and within urban Vietnam,
while in the rural areas the average Vietnamese citizen tends to be poorer and facing almost
no inequality. This view has spurred an assignment of rights of access to income accrued from
unskilled, medium skilled, and skilled types of labour used in Nielsen (2002), and from land and
capital. In doing that, we note that while general education in Vietnam is not high compared to
developed economies, the majority of the population has a standard elementary school education
and literacy levels are above 90% for both genders (UNESCO). This has led to the assumption
that the lower income households receive income both from paid unskilled jobs and from (medium
skill) self-employment. The lower income rural household receives 15% of land rents whereas the
majority of land rents are received by the higher income household. The resulting calculations
a r ep r e s e n t e di nt a b l e5 .
Agri. Non-agri. Paid Total
self-empl. self-empl. labour Land Capital income
earnings earnings earnings share*
Lower income rural household 8663 6 83 5 51 5 03 4 8
Lower income urban household 634 6 62 5 71 8 8
Higher income household 711 6 73 8 78 5 0 100 464
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Nielsen (2002), GSO, IMF WEO, Penn World World Table, and own calculations
*This is the benchmark distribution in the applied model
Table 5: Sectoral income distribution in the Vietnam Model, per cent
On the basis of this income distribution, population shares are assigned and per capita
income measures are calculated.5 The results are presented in table 6.
Finally, in performing the evaluation of the WTO accession rules we need to know the initial
level of tariﬀs. We take these tariﬀs to be the bound tariﬀ rates that Vietnam was obliged to
have in 2007 before entering WTO. These rates (together with the ﬁnal rates to be implemented
in 2014) are attached to the WTO document WT/ACC/VNM/48/Add.1, which is downloadable
from WTO’s homepage. However, since these rates are reported at a very disaggregate tariﬀ
line level – e.g. it contains 1,700-1,800 line items on agricultural products and about 13,000
5We did that by using a Lorenz-curve shape that matches the Vietnamese Gini-coeﬃcient in table 2. The
Lorenz-curve is inspired by an expenditure-based Lorenz-curve in Haughton et al. (2006).12










Lower income rural 
population
58.0 47.3 248,855 15.9 5,259 336.1 14.41 0.92 4.64
Lower income urban 
population
20.0 16.3 134,477 8.6 8,241 526.8 22.58 1.44 7.27
Higher income population 22.0 17.9 331,974 21.2 18,494 1,182 50.67 3.24 16.31
Total 100 81.6 715,307 45.7
Economy average 8,767 560.4 24.02 1.54 7.73
Benchmark scenario   
(year 2004)
Population GDP GDP per capita GDP per capita per day
Source: Nielsen (2002), General Statistics Office Of Vietnam, Haughton et al (2006), IMF WEO, Penn World Table (2006), and own 
calculations
1: PPP correction is 5,035 (IMF WEO)
Table 6: Detailed income distribution based on the Vietnam Model
items on manufacturing products, all at an 8-digit HS trade classiﬁcation – we need ﬁrst to
aggregate them. We have used the following step procedure: (i) calculate simple tariﬀ averages
of detailed HS data to create two-digit level HS data, (ii) convert the two-digit level HS data
to two-digit level SITC data (as we only have detailed trade data for this categorization),6 (iii)
calculate weighted average tariﬀ on one-digit level SITC categories, where the weights are the
trade volumes at the two-digit level SITC,7 and (iv) convert the SITC categorization to the
average tariﬀ rates that our four sectors face using the information from the General Statistics
Oﬃce of Vietnam (GSO, 2004) about ownership.8
The result of this procedure is presented in row one (benchmark) and row two (ﬁnal accession
rates) of table 7 – the rest of the rows present other tariﬀ reform scenarios examined in this
paper and which are explained in detail below.
3.1. The analyzed scenarios. As mentioned above, the benchmark scenario replicates the
tariﬀ structure of the Vietnamese economy at the point of entry at the WTO, i.e. in 2007. In
that benchmark case, the model in section 2 is used, where state-owned enterprises maximize
revenues. Scenarios I-IV in table 7 are all using the same model but with diﬀerent tariﬀ rates.
Scenario I is applying the WTO accession-led tariﬀ cuts that Vietnam has committed to
implement by 2014. As we see, the most notable relative drop is within the light manufacturing
sector (a 39% reduction), followed by the SOE sector (19% reduction) and the primary and
ROE sector (185% reductions). In terms of absolute tariﬀ reductions, the primary and the light
6S e et a b l eA 1i nt h ea p p e n d i xf o rt h e s et a r i ﬀ averages (both the bound 2007 and the ﬁnal 2014 rates).
7Reported at table A2 in the appenidx.
8This ownership information is presented in table A3 in the appendix.13
Scenarios p roe l soe
Benchmark - 2007 tariﬀ rates 2811 3 51 3 31 9 4
I-ﬁnal accession 2014 tariﬀ rates 2291 1 08 11 5 7
II - Concertina cut 1941 3 51 3 31 9 4
III - proportional 20 per cent cut 2251 0 81 0 61 5 5
IV - subsidy experiment 2811 3 51 3 3 −320
V - restructuring SOEs + 2007 tariﬀ rates 2811 3 51 3 31 9 4
VI - restructuring SOEs + 2014 tariﬀ rates 2291 1 08 11 5 7
VII - restructuring SOEs + concertina cut 1941 3 51 3 31 9 4
VIII - restructuring SOEs + proportional cut 2251 0 81 0 61 5 5
Source: WTO, Comtrade, own calculations
Table 7: Tariﬀ rates applied in the scenarios, per cent
manufacturing sector face a 52 percent points cuts, while the SOE face a 37 percent points cut
and the ROE only a 25 percent point cut. Thus, the WTO accession-led tariﬀ cuts reduce both
the mean and the variance of the existent tariﬀ structure. As we know from recent results in the
theory of tariﬀ reforms, such reductions are likely to be welfare enhancing in standard general
equilibrium trade models (see Anderson and Neary, 2007).
Scenarios II and III focus on other tariﬀ reforms that, in conventional settings, should yield
welfare improvements. In scenario II we introduce a concertina cut, where the highest tariﬀ falls
to the second highest tariﬀ level, while scenario III introduces a 20% proportional tariﬀ cut to
all tariﬀ rates. From theory we know that such reductions will also increase welfare, if goods
are substitutes for each other and normality in consumption is assured (see Hatta, 1977) — both
assumptions that hold in our setting.
Scenario IV reduces the tariﬀ on the SOE produced good leaving the other tariﬀ rates
unaltered. In this sense, it is also a univariate reform like the concertina reform, but while the
concertina reform reduces the highest tariﬀ (assuming that this was the highest distortion), here
we reduce the tariﬀ of the sector that distorts mostly the economy (both due to protection and
due to the assumed revenue maximizing behavior). Thus, in essence, the present scenario is really
what a concertina reform should do in our model, i.e. reduce only the highest distortion. In
order to illustrate the potential gains of such a reform, we calculate the optimal tariﬀ reduction.
By using iteration techniques, the rate that maximizes the welfare gain from such a univariate
reform turns out to be a 32% import subsidy.
Scenario V represents a diﬀerent model and constitutes thus a diﬀerent benchmark for the
rest of the scenarios. We apply the initial 2007 tariﬀ structure within a model that does not
contain the assumed state-owned enterprise behavior. This scenario should capture the eﬀects14
of a complete reformation of the SOEs (so that they now behave as proﬁt maximizers and not as
output maximizers) prior to the reformation of tariﬀs. The following 3 scenarios, VI, VII, and
VIII, use this new benchmark situation and allow for tariﬀ reforms. Scenario VI allows for the
ﬁnal 2014 WTO-imposed tariﬀ rates; scenario VII allows for a concertina cut; and scenario VIII
allows for a proportional cut. Such a sequence of scenarios should capture the extra gains that
we may get from external (tariﬀ) reforms when internal (SOE) reforms are already in place.9
4. Results from different counterfactuals
Table 8 below presents the main results from the diﬀerent scenarios.10 We focus on production
eﬃciency, real income and consumption, real factor rewards, and consumers’ welfare change.
4.1. Scenarios I - IV: tariﬀ reforms under a distorted SOE sector. The assessment
of economy-wide eﬃciency shows that the implementation of the ﬁnal WTO tariﬀs (scenario I)
is not overall beneﬁciary to Vietnam, nor is it beneﬁciary for the income inequality that exists
in the country. In fact, the lower income rural population will face a money metric welfare loss
of 12% of their income, while the richer households will gain by 05%. The reason for this may
be assessed both from the supply side and the demand side of the economy.
On the supply side, the change in the tariﬀ scheme is relatively soft on SOE production,
implying that the sector stays relatively protected and still demands an excessive amount of
labour. According to our calculations (see table A7 in the appendix for detailed sector results)
the SOE production consumes 414% –u pf r o m412% in the benchmark scenario – of the
eﬀective labour supply. The labour demand eﬀects in the rest of the sectors skew the relative
labour demand toward private and government services and other activities () at the expense
of the primary sector () and the privately manufactured goods sector ().
Since the primary sector production is more sensitive to changes in the size of the labour
supply, production drops signiﬁcantly (see table A4). With consumer demand for primary goods
9Before we proceed to the descrption of the results, it is important to note that in comparing the diﬀerent
scenarios we use diﬀerent reform sizes. While the concertina brings the highest tariﬀ down to the second highest
tariﬀ level, the proportional reform cuts all tariﬀsl i n e a r l yb y20%, and the WTO accession reform cuts tariﬀsn o n -
linearly by an average of 263% In scenario IV, we ﬁnd the optimal size of the SOE tariﬀ in terms of maximizing
welfare gains. Thus, all our scenarios choose diﬀerent sizes of tariﬀ reductions; a property that in many ways is not
ideal if we wanted to compare the welfare eﬀects, e.g. which reform gives the highest welfare increase. A better
approach would be to set all scenarios at an equal footing (e.g. by requiring that they deliver the same revenues,
or by requiring that they are of the same size) and then see which one performs best (see Raimondos-Møller and
Woodland, 2011). Here we stick to the conventional approach of pre-deﬁning diﬀerent reform sizes and examining
only the sign of the eﬀects (and not the size of the eﬀects).
10More detailed tables are presented in appendix 2.15
hardly aﬀected, the production fall will reduce the exports of the primary sector (see table A5).
Reduction of exports will reduce the overall Vietnamese purchasing power, per se, and thus the
real consumption overall falls. When the lower income rural population suﬀers the most, it is
due to its high dependency on the primary sector. The fall in the eﬀective labour supply in the
primary sector and the fall in rents to the immobile factor jointly produce the largest relative
decline in real income among the three income groups. It suﬀers a 12% real income loss while
the overall loss for the whole population is only 01%.
Main scenarios Competitive scenarios with
scenario V as benchmark
II I I I I I VV VI VII VIII
Production eﬃciency 99.9 99.2 100.0 107.8 109.7 100.0 100.2 100.1
Real income 100.0 99.3 100.0 101.0 109.7 100.1 100.3 100.1
Real consumption 99.9 99.2 100.0 107.8 109.7 99.8 97.8 99.5
Real wage 99.3 97.3 99.3 110.1 88.2 99.1 95.8 99.1
R e n t s t o i m m o b i l e f a c t o r s 9 7 . 39 9 . 99 7 . 91 1 3 . 4163.4 97.3 101.2 97.7
Consumer welfare change (pct.)*
Lower income rural household -1.2 -6.6 -1.7 +16.3 +24.3 -1.4 -7.4 -2.1
Lower income urban household +0.7 +2.4 +0.7 -9.8 -12.3 +1.3 +5.0 +1.5
Higher income household +0.5 +2.4 +0.9 +2.1 +7.6 +0.9 +5.2 +1.6
Consumer welfare change, total -0.1 -0.7 0.0 +4.9 +9.7 +0.1 +0.3 +0.1
Source: The model
* Measured as equivalent variation relative to benchmark income
Table 8: Main results
As we discussed previously, the WTO accession-led reform reduces both the simple mean
and variance of the benchmark tariﬀ structure. Even if these are desirable properties of a
tariﬀ reform, we do not know with certainty whether this particular reform was put wrongly
together.11 Other, more standard, reform rules should be examined. Within the theory of
11For example, it does not follow the (often used by WTO) Swiss rule, where all tariﬀs fall and with the highest
tariﬀs falling mostly.16
piecemeal reforms, two rules are standard; the concertina rule and the proportional rule. Both
rules are known to provide welfare gains under very general assumptions. However, with a
state-owned sector distorting resource allocation, such welfare improvements may not arise.
As seen in column II, table 8, performing a concertina cut will worsen welfare in our model.
The reason is simply the following: lowering the highest tariﬀ (primary products) implies increas-
ing relative protection for the SOE producers. Thus, instead of reducing the biggest distortion
in the economy, this reform will increase it. This will happen at the expense of especially the
primary sector and thus the labour employed in that sector, which to a large extent is the lower-
income rural population. While the welfare of the urban population will rise, this rise is not
enough to neutralize the loss of the rural households.
A proportional cut (column III, table 8) will again not generate gains since lowering all
tariﬀs rates proportionally will bring the primary good tariﬀ level closer to the SOE tariﬀ level.
Thus the SOE sector is again, as in scenarios I and II, protected at the expense of especially
the primary sector. Still, and compared to a concertina cut, the SOE sector’s protection is
relatively reduced. In our simulation example, not signiﬁcant changes will occur in aggregate
real income, production eﬃciency, and in general aggregate welfare. However, income inequality
will deﬁnitely increase with the lower income households loosing out again.
Both these two scenarios underline the consequences of underestimating the presence of a
special SOE behavior and thus falsely suggesting concertina or proportional cuts in the search
for welfare gains.
In scenario IV we return to the univariate type of reforms where only one tariﬀ is reduced.
However, now we choose a diﬀerent tariﬀ than the highest one. Let us explain. When tariﬀs
are the only distortions in a model, reducing the highest tariﬀ is usually equivalent to reducing
the biggest distortion. However, when other distortions are in place, the highest tariﬀ may
not be equivalent with the biggest distortion. In the present model the sector that distorts
mostly the eﬃcient allocation of resources is the sector with state-owned enterprises. Even if
that sector does not face the highest tariﬀ protection, it is that sector’s tariﬀ that should be
reduced. Leaving thus all the other tariﬀs unaltered, scenario IV allows the tariﬀ of the SOE
sector to fall.12
12Note that an alternative reform would be not to constrain the direction of the tariﬀ reform, and thus to allow
raising the protection in other sectors. However, since such reforms can not be part of a WTO-based reform, we
abstract from such reforms in this paper.17
The next question then is how much to reduce that tariﬀ.13 In what follows we use iteration
techniques and perform a numerical search for the locally optimal SOE tariﬀ,i . e .aS O Et a r i ﬀ
that maximizes the aggregate welfare gain given that the other tariﬀs do not change. As can be
read from table 7, this optimal tariﬀ turns out to be negative, i.e. an import subsidy, and equal
to 32% By subsidizing the imports of the goods produced by the state-owned enterprises, the
aggregate welfare will rise by 49% with the poor rural households beneﬁting the most and thus
reducing inequality (see column IV, table 8). The mechanisms for such results are based on the
fact that the eﬀective supply of labour to the state-owned sector will drop to 208% (down from
412%), leaving labour to be re-allocated to other sectors where its use is more eﬃcient. As a
result of this, the primary sector ends up increasing its exports. In general, trade as part of the
country’s GDP increases considerably (see table A5 in the appendix).
In general what such a reform shows is that the ingredient that is necessary to be included in
a welfare increasing tariﬀ reform is a large and disproportionate reduction of the tariﬀ faced by
the SOE sector. This sector has been attracting too many recourses, and as long as this sector
is not reformed fundamentally, one should subsidize the imports of the goods produced by the
state-owned enterprises. This will reduce the domestic production of these goods and move the
freed-up inputs towards other sectors where they can be better used.
4.2. Scenarios V-VIII: tariﬀ reforms under a competitive SOE sector. We now
move to a diﬀerent situation, where tariﬀ reforms are performed after reforming the SOE sector
into a competitive sector. Clearly, in that situation the rental rate of capital in the SOE sector
will not be zero anymore. Firms in that sector will now have an incentive to choose a more
balanced use of capital and labour, and capital rents will be distributed back to households.
To create a new benchmark for analyzing tariﬀ liberalization, we ﬁrst allow for such internal
reforms when no external reforms are yet put into place (i.e. the initial tariﬀ rates are still in
place); this is the situation depicted in scenario V.14 As it is easy to see from table 8, internal
reforms result in large gains in all accounts; an overall welfare increase by 97%; a reduction of
income inequality with the lower income households experiencing a large 243% increase in their
13Since tariﬀ levels do not provide much information in this setting, we can not follow the "down to the second
highest tariﬀ level"-type of rule.
14In doing this, we use the same calibration values of the model as for the previous scenarios. A better procedure
would have been to re-calibrate the model under the assumption that the benchmark model was fully perfectly
competitive and then do the counterfactual that is described in scenario V. However, since in reality the benchmark
case is not charcterised by a fully competitive state-owned sector, we do not have the data to do such a calibration
correctly. Based on this caveat, scenarios V-VIII should only be seen as illustrative.18
income; a 97% increase in production eﬃciency, real income, and real consumption. All that
while wages fall across all sectors and income from rents to immobile factors increases by 634%
As we have discussed above, the non-competitive nature of the SOE sector is the largest
distortion in the Vietnamese economy and reforming that sector creates large overall gains. An
economy wide eﬃciency improvement of 97% compared to the benchmark level is unleashed
through a migration of eﬀective labour resources to the primary sector (see table A7 in the
appendix). This underlines that SOEs ﬁrst and foremost attract labour resources from the sector
with the most labour intensive production. The primary sector is also the main employment
sector of the Vietnamese economy, employing some 58% of the working population. Hence,
it is no surprise that the lower-income rural Vietnamese population is the big winner of an
SOE reform. An increase in real income of 243% (table A9, appendix) to the lower-income
rural population brings the average GDP per capita per day from 090 dollars to 111 dollars.
The lower-income urban population stands to lose considerably from the restructuring since an
important income source, SOE employment, is downsized dramatically. However, the money-
metric welfare gains accrued to the two other population groups by far exceeds the loss of
the lower-income urban population. Thus, by redistributing ex post, Pareto improvement is
attainable.
The surge in economic activity in the exporting primary sector improves the purchasing
power of the Vietnamese economy, adding to the welfare gains. This is also the essence of the
gains from trade: optimal production induces trade patterns that improve consumer welfare by
exporting goods of the sector in which the country is relatively more competitive, and importing
what is relatively unfavorable to produce domestically.
If now, on top of these internal reforms, we allow tariﬀ reductions then there will be extra
gains to the economy. However, these gains are now marginal and of the order one would expect
in standard competitive setups. As seen in columns VI-VII of table 8, a WTO-imposed tariﬀ
reduction will lead to an extra overall welfare gain of 01%, while a concertina and a proportional
reform will increase welfare by 03% and 01% respectively, compared to the benchmark situation
described in column V. While the concertina and the proportional cuts were expected to give
welfare gains (based on known theoretical results), the fact that the WTO-accession tariﬀ cuts
also give comparable welfare gains is reassuring.15
15The size of these welfare eﬀects are speciﬁc to the simulations performed here and have no generalization
power – see footnote 9 above.19
5. Concluding remarks
Developing countries, especially socialist oriented developing countries, highly rely on state
production. Indeed, Vietnam relies heavily on state industrial production. Such a predominant
position of state-owned enterprises needs special consideration or otherwise mistaken policy
conclusions can be made. The policy that this paper considers is the trade liberalization scheme
that WTO has imposed on Vietnam upon its accession into the WTO in 2007.T a r i ﬀsh a v et o
fall in a pre-deﬁned way by 2014. As we show, the ultimate gains from trade liberalization on
economic development in Vietnam will be greatly at stake due to the distortions created by the
strong presence of state-owned enterprises.
In the model it is assumed that the management in a state-owned enterprise pursues maxi-
mization of revenues instead of proﬁts. Such behavior induces over-hiring of labour, attracting
extra labour resources from the competitive sectors of the economy. Trade policy should take
this into account and design tariﬀs in order to correct this over-production.16
The WTO accession-led tariﬀ reform does not take all this into account. Tariﬀs on state-
owned produced goods fall, but not a lot – other sectors’ tariﬀs fall even more. As a result,
the WTO accession tariﬀ cuts will worsen the situation for Vietnam with the state-owned sector
expanding even more. There are also distributional consequences to be aware of. Our results
show that the aggregate welfare loss will hit mostly the lower-income rural population. These are
the people that work in the sensitive labour-intensive primary sector. As generally recognized,
this rural population is the prime source of poverty in developing countries, so the fact that the
welfare losses are primarily within the lower end of the income scale demands special attention.
Policy makers must recognize that state-owned produced goods have to undergo relatively
larger trade liberalization than competitively produced goods to secure the gains from trade.
Therefore, not even other traditional tariﬀ reforms (such as proportional tariﬀ cuts and con-
certina cuts) will work in this setting. Such reforms will fail to reduce suﬃciently the protection
of the state-owned sector and thus bound to fail. Indeed, our calculations show that this is
clearly the case.
Inspired by the basic principle behind the concertina tariﬀ cut reform, viz. that we should
reduce the highest distortion, we suggest a tariﬀ reform that targets the highest distortion in
the present model. We reduce the tariﬀ of the state-owned enterprises leaving the other tariﬀs
unchanged. To show the potential that such a reform can have, we search for the tariﬀ level
16The optimal tariﬀ levels for such a small open economy are clearly not zero.20
that will maximize the potential welfare gains. It turns out that the imports of the state-owned
produced good should be subsidized by 32% In that case, both the aggregate welfare and the
welfare of the low income rural population will rise considerably.
Clearly, if Vietnam was able to complete within the accession period a reform of state-owned
enterprises so that they become competitive, the WTO accession schedule of ﬁnal rates, as all
other conventional tariﬀ reforms, will yield aggregate welfare gains. However, such a complete
restructuring of the state-owned enterprises is far from what is going on in reality.21
Appendix 1: Additional data
per cent
SITC Group Bound Final
01 Meat and meat preparations  30,0 16,6
02 Dairy products and birds’ eggs  23,5 19,5
03 Fish (not marine mammals), crustaceans, 
molluscs and aquatic invertebrates, and 
preparations thereof 
31,1 20,1
04 Cereals and cereal preparations  28,5 23,7
05 Vegetables and fruit  29,1 24,1
06 Sugars, sugar preparations and honey  36,2 31,5
07 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, and manufactures 
thereof 
29,4 23,7
08 Feeding stuff for animals (not including 
unmilled cereals) 
8,0 5,0
09 Misc. edible products etc 31,5 22,8
11 Beverages  60,7 45,4
12 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures  109,6 99,6
21 Hides, skins and furskins, raw  5,0 2,4
22 Oil-seeds and oleaginous fruits  10,5 8,3
23 Crude rubber (including synthetic and 
reclaimed) 
6,0 4,8
24 Cork and wood  0,5 0,5
25 Pulp and waste paper  1,4 1,1
26 Textile fibres (other than wool tops and other 
combed wool) and their wastes (not 
manufactured into yarn or fabric) 
12,4 5,8
27 Crude fertilizers, other than those of Division 
56, and crude minerals (excluding coal, 
petroleum and precious stones) 
6,7 6,7
28 Metalliferous ore, scrap  2,2 2,2
29 Crude animal and vegetable materials, n.e.s.  5,3 4,5
rates per cent
SITC Group Bound Final
33 Petroleum, petroleum products and related mat
23,3 23,2
34 Gas, natural and manufactured  4,5 4,5
74 General industrial machinery and equipment, 
n.e.s., and machine parts, n.e.s. 
10,5 8,3
75 Office machines and automatic data-
processing machines 
7,4 1,5
76 Telecommunications and sound-recording and 
reproducing apparatus and equipment 
17,8 11,0
77 Electrical machinery, apparatus and 
appliances, n.e.s., and electrical parts thereof 
(including non-electrical counterparts, n.e.s., of 
electrical household-type equipment) 
12,4 9,2
78 Road vehicles (including air-cushion vehicles)  55,8 41,6
79 Other transport equipment  7,1 5,8
81 Prefabricated buildings sanitary, plumbing, 
heating and lighting fixtures and fittings, n.e.s. 
20,2 15,5
83 Travel goods, handbags and similar 
containers 
39,1 25,0
84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories  21,2 19,5
85 Footwear  35,6 27,1
87 Professional, scientific and controlling 
instruments and apparatus, n.e.s. 
2,4 1,3
88 Photographic apparatus, equipment and 
supplies and optical goods, n.e.s. watches and 
clocks 
12,6 8,6
89 Miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s.  20,4 15,0
93 Special transactions and commodities not 
classified according to kind 
0,0 0,0




T a b l eA 1 :A v e r a g et a r i ﬀ rates, 2-digit SITC categories: 00-20, and 30-90
rates (%)
SITC Group Bound 2007 rates Final 2014 rates
0 Food, foodstuﬀ and live animals 2151 6 6
1 Beverages and tobacco 10349 2 7
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 583 7
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 2262 2 6
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and wax 1701 4 3
5 Chemical and related products, n.e.s. 1306 5
6 Manufactured goods classiﬁed chieﬂyb ym a t e r i a l s 1511 2 2
7 Machinery, transport and equipment 2221 6 1
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 2001 5 7
9O t h e r 151 5
Source: Comtrade, WTO and own calculations
Table A2: Average tariﬀ rates, 1-digit SITC categories22
By kind of economic activity GDP Share Vietnam Model Sector Ownership
Agriculture 16,7 Primary Private
Forestry 1,3 Primary Private
Fishing 3,8 Primary Private
Mining and quarrying 10,1 SOE State
Manufacturing 20,3 SOE/Private State/Private
Electricity, gas and water supply 3,5 SOE/Private State/Private
Construction 6,2 SOE/Private State/Private
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles, 
motor cycles and  personal and household goods 13,6 ROE Private
Hotels and restaurants 3,2 ROE Private
Transport, storage and communications 4,3 ROE Private
Financial intermedation 1,8 ROE State
Scientific activities and technology 0,6 ROE State
Real estate, renting and business activities 4,4 ROE Private




Education and training 3,3 ROE State
Health and social work 1,5 ROE State
Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 0,5 ROE Private
Activities of party and of membership 
organisations 0,1 ROE State
Community, social and personal service activities 2,0 ROE State
Private households with employed persons 0,2 ROE Private
Source: GSO (2004)
Table A3: Sector allocation in the model
Appendix 2: Detailed results from simulations
benchmark = index 100 Bencmark I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Primary sector 100.0 97.7 85.8 96.6 143.6 169.4 98.5 91.6 97.7
Priv. and gov. services, 
and other activities
100.0 101.2 103.2 101.2 108.4 112.4 101.4 104.7 101.4
Private manufacturing 100.0 98.9 103.2 101.2 108.4 112.4 99.1 104.7 101.5
State manufacturing 100.0 100.2 101.5 100.2 81.5 63.0 100.3 102.1 100.3
Total economy 100.0 99.9 99.2 100.0 107.8 109.7 100.0 100.2 100.1
Source: The Vietnam model
Scenarios VI-VIII are relative to scenario V.
Table A4: Production eﬃciency
Primary sector -9.2 -8.5 -5.2 -8.1 -20.5 -20.9 -20.1 -16.5 -19.7
Priv. and gov. services, 
and other activities
5.4 4.9 3.8 5.0 -1.7 4.6 4.1 2.8 4.1
Private manufacturing -6.6 -6.3 -7.1 -6.8 -8.2 -6.8 -6.6 -7.5 -7.1
State manufacturing 7.5 7.8 6.8 7.8 25.0 17.8 18.4 17.6 18.4
Source: The Vietnam model
Benchmark II III V II V per cent VII VIII VI
Table A5: Net trade (% of GDP)
benchmark = index 100 Bencmark I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Primary sector 100 93.8 80.0 92.4 143.6 169.4 94.6 85.4 93.4
Priv. and gov. services, 
and other activities
100 98.9 103.2 98.8 108.4 112.4 99.1 104.7 99.0
Private manufacturing 100 94.4 103.2 98.8 108.4 112.4 94.6 104.7 99.1
State manufacturing
Total economy 100 97.3 99.9 97.9 113.4 163.4 97.3 101.2 97.7
Source: The Vietnam model
Scenarios VI-VIII are relative to scenario V.
Table A6: Rents to immobile factors23
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Primary sector 25.1 24.3 20.7 24.0 39.2 48.1 47.3 43.2 46.7
Priv. and gov. services, 
and other activities
26.0 26.7 27.8 26.7 30.8 33.2 34.2 36.5 34.2
Private manufacturing 7.7 7.6 8.3 7.9 9.1 9.9 9.7 10.9 10.2
State manufacturing 41.2 41.4 43.2 41.4 20.8 8.8 8.9 9.5 8.9
Source: Vietnam Model
Note: Percentage share of the total effective labour force
Per cent             Benchmark
Table A7: Eﬀective labour supply
Benchmark I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Lower income rural 
household
0.85 99.3 97.3 99.3 110.1 88.2 99.1 95.8 99.1
Lower income urban 
household
0.85 99.4 97.2 99.3 110.0 88.2 99.1 95.7 99.0
Higher income 
household
0.85 99.5 98.0 99.5 107.1 88.2 99.3 96.4 99.2
Source: The Vietnam model
Real wage  Scenario wage levels (benchmark = index 100)
Note: The model operates with a single nominal wage rate meausered per effective labour unit. Real wage rates are based on 
expenditure weighted priceindices according to household consumption spending compositions. Scenarios VI-VIII are relative to 
scenario V.
Table A8: Real wage by household
per cent I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Lower income rural 
household
-1.1 -6.6 -1.6 +12.0 +24.3 -1.0 -5.6 -1.6
Lower income urban 
household
+0.7 +2.5 +0.8 -13.1 -12.3 +1.1 +4.2 +1.2
Higher income 
household
+0.5 +2.5 +1.0 -1.6 +7.6 +0.7 +4.1 +1.3
Total 0.0 -0.7 0.0 +1.0 +9.7 +0.1 +0.3 +0.1
Source: The Vietnam model
Note: Real income is measured as household nominal income deflated by an expenditure weighted price index specific 
to each household. Scenarios VI-VIII are relative to scenario V.
Table A9: Real income changes
benchmark = index 100 Bencmark I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Primary sector 100 101.0 105.2 101.5 88.6 109.3 101.2 106.5 101.6
Priv. and gov. services, 
and other activities
100 99.4 98.4 99.5 88.9 109.9 99.5 99.3 99.6
Private manufacturing 100 101.5 99.3 99.7 87.9 108.1 101.6 100.4 99.8
State manufacturing 100 100.1 98.4 100.2 139.5 109.9 100.2 99.3 100.3
Total economy 100 99.9 99.2 100.0 107.8 109.7 101.6 109.1 102.4
Source: The Vietnam model
Scenarios VI-VIII are relative to scenario V.
Table 10: Real consumption changes by sector
benchmark = index 100 Bencmark I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Lower income rural 
household
100 98.8 93.3 98.3 119.5 124.3 99.0 94.4 98.4
Lower income urban 
household
100 100.7 102.4 100.7 92.7 87.7 99.0 94.4 98.4
Higher income 
household
100 100.5 102.3 100.9 105.0 107.6 99.8 97.3 99.4
Total economy 100 99.9 99.2 100.0 107.8 109.7 99.8 97.8 99.5
Source: The Vietnam model
Scenarios VI-VIII are relative to scenario V.
Table A11: Real consumption changes by household24
Appendix 3: Data sources
Our main sources of data are the following:
• Comtrade, United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, at
— http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/.
• European Commission:
— Trade issues: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/newround/index_en.htm
— GSP 2003: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/global/gsp/gspguide.htm
— External relations: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/index.htm
— External relations with Vietnam:
– http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/vietnam/intro/index.htm
• GSO, General Statistics Oﬃce of Vietnam, http://www.gso.gov.vn/
• IMF, 2006, various online information incl. statistics. WEO: World Economic Outlook
Database.
• Heston, A., R. Summers, and B. Aten, 2006, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Penn-
sylvania.
• World Bank, 2007, World Development Indicators database,
— http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf.
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